一個骯髒的政府
陳真 2004. 9. 6.
維根斯坦常勸他認為優秀的學生放棄哲學，叫他們去工廠工作，最好是去當礦工。那些據說
優秀的學生，有些聽從建議，真的棄哲從工，變成工人，從此埋沒。
有一回，他勸一個快畢業的學生，叫他連文憑也不要拿。但這學生說不拿不行啊，不拿娘會
罵人。維根斯坦說，「可是，沒有人能為了文憑而從事哲學思考。」
後來，那個學生畢業了。維根斯坦不死心，怕他墮落，於是又找他去喝茶，企圖勸他，希望
他千萬不要跑去教哲學；維根斯坦說，「不可能有人能一方面當個正直的人，一方面又在大
學教哲學。」
這回，那個學生答應不去教哲學，維根斯坦聽了粉開心。後來兩人說再見時，維根斯坦問他
，那麼，你打算將來做什麼？那個學生說，他想去當記者。
幾十年後，這個學生寫起這段回憶。他後來依然成為一名哲學教授，但他說，當他跟維根斯
坦說他準備去當記者時，維根斯坦的臉色彷彿是聽到他要去當賊一樣難看。
另外還有一位學生，後來也成為著名哲學家，叫做 Malcolm。當他找到耶魯大學教職時，維根斯坦寫了封信給他，叫他千萬不要去幹這種事，�]為他還沒學會安靜，還沒學會老實講話；叫他不要跟記者一樣，只會胡說八道。
除了記者和教授討人厭之外，維根斯坦最討厭的還包括政客。記者、教授、政客三位一體，
都是最會胡說八道、最不老實、最言不由衷的一群人。 我看不只記者，很多名人或座談會專家更討人厭。他們總是講一些他們一點也不在乎的話。
===========
以上是剛剛閱報的感想。
看一些人，談到車臣的事，或是談到這個那個，實在很討人厭，因為他們往往只是在做一種
文字表演，根本不在乎或甚至不知道自己在說什麼。比方說，「痛罵」恐怖份子，或提出某
種「道德教誨」，或「表痛心」等等，可是，他們真的在「痛罵」、真的感到什麼「痛心」
嗎？他們真的在乎那些動聽的「道德教誨」嗎？我大多感受不到。文字市場上，往往只感受
到一種冷漠和表演，一種「與我無關」、「隨口說說」的態度。
一個人，如果真的對什麼感到「痛心」，那麼，他的人生絕不會像今天那樣；他肯定會有另
外一種人生。
===========
看過哈巴狗電台的人，或許記得我曾談過兩件事：
一是發生在去年五月的事，英國情治單位內部狗咬狗，抖出大黑幕：原來英國過去二、三十 幾年來 IRA 所幹下的所謂恐怖事件，其中一大半是英國政府自己幹的；而所謂殺人不眨眼的 IRA 恐怖份子首領，竟然是英國情治人員。 這不希奇，因為自導自演恐怖事件，好處多多。第一，有利選情，第二，抹黑對手，第三， 提供大力鎮壓的理由；第四，策畫並執行恐怖事件，是滲透過程中取得對方信任，進而在敵 營中步步高昇的必要手段。
第二件事就是 911。這我寫過幾個長篇，也提出過無數證據。以我一人調查之力，所得「情報」，都要比美國國會後來裝模作樣的所謂調查，還要早了將近一年，而且內容要更精準確實許多。他們有可能那麼無能嗎？不會吧？！那只是在演戲。
911 的調查結論很簡單。第一種可能，可以說是毫無疑問了，那就是美國政府事先完全知情；他 根本就是「樂觀其成」。第二種可能，可能性約八成，那就是自導自演，要不然，不太可能 在事件一兩年前就滿心期望來個「珍珠港事件」，以便執行反恐大業，而且老天爺還果真十 分配合，馬上就給他一個「珍珠港事件」，讓他大展鴻圖。我不信天底下會有這麼巧的事。
事實上，第一種可能就已經包括了第二種可能。因為，知情之後的一連串袖手旁觀，就是一
種促成和參與。
政治裏沒有偶然這回事。我研究過一些所謂恐怖事件或意外事件，到頭來，幾乎都和那些事
件的受益者—也就是當權者—脫離不了關係，或者根本就是他自己幹的。
早上跟反戰專家說，我懷疑這次的校園綁架學童事件，恐怕也是俄國當局自己幹的。她不信
。我也沒辦法。因為事情才剛發生，我也只能預言，毫無證據。
但是，對此事雖無證據。對之前的所謂恐怖事件，證據倒是一大堆，根本講不完，幾乎都是
俄國當局自己幹的。
要講完這一切，恐怕得寫成一本書。所以我就只能長話短說了。1994-1996 年間，車臣一些動亂，常被葉爾欽拿來做為政治和選舉操弄，但這些暴力事件，成因費解， 似乎是當局有意造成。1996 年，葉爾欽成功再度當選總統之後，暴亂反而隨之平息，十分詭異。 1999 年，換基旦布丁要選總統時，奇怪，馬上又天下大亂，恐怖份子又來幫布丁助選了。WSWS (節錄一段如下) 說，克里姆林宮裏一群政客(主要是某個媒體大亨 Boris Berezovsky)，組織了一群 “車獨份子”，進攻 Dagestan，幹了一連串爆炸，一共奪走三百條人命。
全國於是陷入一片恐慌和氣憤，有魄力的布丁於是成為救星，只有選他，才有辦法打擊車獨
這些恐怖份子。於是基旦布丁就高票凍蒜了。
WSWS 說，俄國前前後後用過多次這種手段。詳情略過。我直接講歌劇院人質事件好了。底下英文
《附件一》，取自 WSWS。懶得看的，可以直接跳過去。後面是講歌劇院事件。但是，跳過去之前，不妨看看底 下英文中有關Berezovsky的部份，這是俄羅斯一位一度呼風喚雨的有錢政客。他因為和布丁 不合，被迫流亡英國，抖出了這些選舉骯髒步。
他指證歷歷說，1997 年，他策動暴亂，給了車獨領袖之一 Shamil Basaiev 三百萬美元。1999
年秋天，在莫斯科和 Volgodonsk的幾次大爆炸，全是由俄國情治單位 FSB 所主導，而他就是這幾次所謂 “恐怖事件” 的策劃者。
在講歌劇院事件前，得先認識一個頗受各方尊崇的女記者，也就是我在黑寡婦那篇文章中所
提到的Anna Politkovskaia (以下簡稱安娜)。她很勇敢，在國外曾多次得過新聞獎章，表彰他在俄國高壓統治下的勇氣 。她曾被捕，但在國際壓力下，旋即被釋放，經常遭受來自軍方或官方的暴力威脅，甚至威 脅要取她的性命。
底下《附件二》和《附件三》是兩篇簡介。講這個只是要說，這個記者的人品和報導水平都
無庸置疑，是個很難得一見的好記者。除報導外，並且經常以實際行動救援難民。也因此，
不管在車臣或俄羅斯，都受到兩邊人民以及車臣反抗軍的尊敬。
歌劇院事件發生時，她正要前往美國領獎。但綁架者要求她代表俄羅斯出面談判；於是立即
從美國趕回俄國。 兩年前的歌劇院事件中，俄國媒體說恐怖份子有 41 人，大多查出姓名，全數死亡。事件後，人質也死了 126個，除了一名是被俄軍誤殺之外，其它全部死於俄軍所施放的毒氣。
奇怪的是，恐怖份子的屍體卻只有 40 具。有一個不見了。後來被安娜查出這個漏網之魚，並且找到了他，叫做Khanpash Nurdyevich Terkibayev。這個恐怖份子是個車臣人，卻隸屬俄國情治單位，並且和布丁總統府有直接連 繫。他同意接受安娜採訪，並承認自己長年滲透在敵人陣營，負責策畫此次歌劇院事件。
他很得意地出示安娜一些相關文件，以及一個由情治單位 FSB 所發出的刑事豁免令，以證實自己的身份。 安娜把這段採訪，寫成一篇文章，如下《附件四》，叫做《有一名恐怖份子還活著：我們找 到了他》，發表在俄國報紙 Novaya Gazeta，日期是去年 4 月 28 日。
這位特務說，歌劇院事件最初是敵人所發起，但卻是由他所鼓動，他跟對方說，“一切都在
掌握之中”，“到處都有腐敗的人”，“要收買很容易”。於是，就由他負責策畫和帶路， 在俄國情治單位之刻意配合掩護下，把這四十名車獨人士給祕密送進莫斯科，並且賄賂打通 關節，進入歌劇院。 在施放毒氣前幾個小時，他在俄國情治人員協助下，偷偷從後門跑了。安娜問他說：你的意 思是說所謂拯救行動純粹只是在演一齣愚弄人民的大戲？他說不是。他說，當場只有極少數 高階人員知道這只是一齣戲，其他人則完全不知情，他們的確以為自己在拼命。但他拒絕透 露他的直屬上司究竟是誰。
這個臥底的情治人員還說，他故意找來很多黑寡婦，原因是「女生比較多愁善感」，很容易
煽動她們犧牲生命，而且，他說，找女殺手來，對社會大眾「更有恐怖效果」。 在這篇報導底下，則是一篇更完整的文章《附件五》，是史丹佛大學 Hoover Institution一位資深研究員對歌劇院事件的詳細報告。很長，大約兩萬字，有 145 個 footnotes。《附件六》則是一篇車臣本身對此事的報導。接下來《附件七》是車臣外交部 公文，抗議俄羅斯之自導自演，嫁禍於車臣。
另外，安娜寫了一本書，Amazon 買得到，叫做《一個骯髒的戰爭—一個俄國記者在車臣》（A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya），記錄俄國之種種血腥殺戮和違反人權事件，以及一些自導自演的所謂恐怖事件 。
2001 年，軍方曾揚言取安娜性命，安娜認為此項威脅極其真實，因此逃到維也納，直到歌劇院事 件，才應 “恐怖份子” 要求，回到俄國，做為政府談判代表，此後一直住在莫斯科。
另外，光是在2002年，俄羅斯就有三名記者因為報導言論不當，得罪當局而遇害，全是 “意外” 事件，查無犯罪成份。 至於這位自己爆料的情治人員，在爆料後接到死亡警告。安娜說，在她把文章登出後不久， 包括車臣和俄羅斯方面，都有人傳話說，這個洩密的臥底人員：「沒有多少日子可活」。幾 個月後，他果然死於一宗車禍 “意外” 事件。
另外，一位現居倫敦的前俄國情治高階人員 Aleksandr Litvinenko，對媒體揭露：1999 年幾次住宅區大爆炸，正是俄國情治單位自導自演，目的是嫁禍車獨人士，進而做為發動第 二次車臣戰爭的藉口。
故事講完了。人們喜歡談政治，但卻總是被政治玩弄而不自知。政治的複雜和醜陋，似乎每
一次都遠遠超出我們的想像。對照起這種國際水平，台灣政治顯然還挺乾淨，至少槍傷是製
造在自己身上，而不是以千百萬人性命做為一種選舉籌碼或政治動員藉口。
但台灣似乎正努力迎頭趕上國際水平；我總覺得，大家似乎都有機會親身體會戰爭的滋味；
這當然得感謝民進黨囉。
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《附件一》WSWS談俄羅斯對恐怖事件的操弄與製造
What lies behind the recent explosions in Chechnya?
By Vladimir Volkov
29 May 2003
A series of powerful explosions in Chechnya earlier this month gave the lie to claims by the Russian
government of Vladimir Putin and by the pro-Russian local administration of Ahmad Kadyrov that the
present situation in the republic is leading to peace and the restoration of normality.
Only a few months ago, at the end of December 2002, there occurred another powerful explosion.
Two trucks packed with explosives were blown up near a complex of administration buildings in
Grozny. Over 80 people died and more than 300 were hurt in that incident.
Just two months ago, at the end of March, the Russian government conducted a referendum aimed at
legitimising the structures of neocolonial control established during the second Chechen war. The
citizens of Chechnya elected to remain within the Russian Federation in return for nominal
autonomy. Not a single one of the regional problems was or could have been solved by this vote. The
recent explosions have served as a reminder that the emergency regime, the general mood of
hostility, and the generalised chaos within Chechnya have not diminished by comparison with the
1999-2002 period, when “constitutional peace was being reestablished.”
The first of the two explosions occurred on Monday morning, May 12, in the Nadterechny region of
Chechnya situated in the north of the republic and long considered a more pro-Russian region. A large
truck loaded with tons of trinitrotoluene and masked with sacks of cement approached a group of
administrative buildings in the regional center of Znamenskoie. The truck attempted to crash through
the metal barrier blocking the roadway, but the shock detonated the explosives. Although more than
30 metres still separated the truck from the buildings, the consequences of the explosion were quite
serious. Nine buildings, seven of them inhabited houses, plus buildings housing the local
administration and the local security office, were damaged. Fifty-nine people were killed, and at
least 200 were hurt.
Three people were in the cab of this truck, which was presumably driven from the neighbouring
republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, successfully negotiating a number of roadblocks. There is continuing
reconstruction in Chechnya due to its wartime devastation, and many cement trucks drive into the
region from neighbouring areas. It is not impossible to either fake travel permits or bribe the soldiers
at control posts.
The second explosion occurred two days later, on Wednesday morning local time. A Moslem religious
service was taking place in the village of Ilaskhan-Iurt, devoted to the Prophet Muhammad and one of
the Moslem preachers active during the 19th century. Over 10,000 people from Chechnya, Dagestan
and Ingushetia gathered for the ceremony. The head of the Chechen administration, Ahmad Kadyrov,
who is himself a bona fide Moslem cleri,c was leading the prayer. As the service was finishing, a
female suicide bomber approached the group of people around Kadyrov and triggered her bomb.
Eighteen people, four of them Kadyrov’s bodyguards, were killed, and more than 150 people were
wounded. Kadyrov himself was not hurt.
Actually, there were two women suicide bombers: the 46-year-old Shahidat Baimuradova, who
exploded her bomb, and 52-year-old Zulai Abdulzakova. They introduced themselves as journalists,
and the bomb was hidden inside their movie camera. Shrapnel from the first explosion fatally
wounded the second woman; hence, there was only one explosion.
The first question to arise from such horrible news: What leads an average inhabitant of Chechnya to
resort to such desperate actions? It is clear that, as with the situation in Palestine, the answer lies in
the profound disappointment with the existing political parties and movements and the absence of
any progressive social perspective.
All of this takes place within the context of continuing violence and terror by the Russian military
against the civilian population. Since the end of March (i.e., after the conclusion of the referendum),
over 70 abductions were committed in Chechnya, all of them attributed to the Russian military.
According to one Chechen official, more than 245 Chechen citizens had disappeared since the
beginning of this year.
The fact that women took part in the latest terror actions shows the breadth of dissatisfaction and
the degree of desperation that pushes such varied elements of Chechen society to acts of suicidal
terror.
“Arab connection”
Russian President Putin hurried to connect these Chechen explosions to the recent bombings in Saudi
Arabia during Colin Powell’s visit there. Putin proclaimed that both the Chechen and the Saudi
attacks were the work of a single Islamic terrorist organization headed by Al-Qaeda. Russian officials
simultaneously reported that about $1 million were transferred to Chechnya before the explosions.
The Kremlin’s propaganda machine is trying to suggest that this money was provided by
international Islamic organisations to fund the explosions in Znamenskoie and in Ilaskhan-Iurt.
We cannot, of course, exclude this possibility. Connections between the armed Chechen separatists
and various international Islamic institutions have been fairly well established in the past few years.
The problem lies in establishing whether such ties are strong enough to support the sort of long-range
planning and organisation of these widespread operations. On the other hand, there must exist
significant political motives for actions of this nature.
The more significant question is this: Does Al-Qaeda or any other Islamic fundamentalist movement
require these Chechen outrages at this time?
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Russian president Putin decided to support the Bush
administration’s war on “international terrorism.” The radical Islamic groups, therefore, could
justifiably view the Russian regime as one of their enemies.
However, the US war on Iraq has altered the political landscape. This war significantly damaged
Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Putin’s administration is very frightened by the
outcome of the military campaign in Iraq. Compared to France and Germany, Russia has been more
reluctant to accept the American administration’s demand for the complete removal of
international sanctions on Iraq, which would legitimise the US neocolonial occupation of this country,
and its control of the country’s oil reserves, the second largest in the world.
The recent explosions in Chechnya served to alleviate tensions in the US-Russian relationship. To
some extent, Putin has rehabilitated himself in the eyes of Bush Jr. as a strategic partner. If Islamists
abroad wanted to take revenge on Putin or harm his interests, they failed miserably and achieved
just the reverse.
At the same time, if we take into account the role played by Chechnya in domestic Russian policies
throughout the 1990s, the methods of provocations, conspiracies, and criminal combinations utilised
by the Kremlin, and the geopolitical significance of Chechnya for the Russian government, then we
can reasonably suppose that various influential forces within the ruling Russian elite groupings might
have had an interest in seeing a new wave of bloody violence in Chechnya.
Kremlin’s methods and interests
First, a new outbreak of violence in the northern Caucasus could further a long-range strategy to
secure Putin’s reelection in the presidential elections next year. Revelations during the last few
years have established that the crisis in Chechnya was frequently utilised by the Moscow regime to
impose political decisions that could not be forced upon the society in any other way.
The first Chechen campaign was started in late 1994 to organise a “small victorious war” and prop
up the shaky authority of the Yeltsin government. As soon as Yeltsin was reelected in the summer of
1996, the war was stopped, even though the generals were loath to admit a military defeat, and
although it seemed demeaning to the Great Russian mindset of a section of the population (the peace
of Khasaviurt in August 1996).
This scenario was played out in an even more cynical and reckless manner during the opening of the
Second Chechen war in the fall of 1999. In order to secure the transfer of power from Yeltsin to
Putin, the Kremlin politicians (specifically, the then all-powerful oligarch and media magnate Boris
Berezovsky) organised an invasion by groups of Chechen separatists into Dagestan followed by a series
of bombings of houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk, costing the lives of 300 people. The atmosphere of
fear created by these actions was used to channel popular opinion behind Putin. In March 2000,
Vladimir Putin was swept into office as Russia’s president on a wave of nationalist hysteria.
Additionally, suspicions about the “Kremlin’s hand” are aroused by the events of last fall in
Moscow, when a group of armed Chechens took about 800 people hostage in a theater. According to
the story published by Anna Politkovskaia, a journalist of Novaia Gazeta, an agent of the Russian FSB,
the secret police, infiltrated this group headed by Movsar Baraiev. This agent, according to the story,
succeeded in escaping the building and surviving the government rescue assault, as a result of which
129 hostages and the whole group of about 50 Chechen militants were killed.
If this report is true (Politkovskaia published an interview with the unnamed agent, who had
admitted his role in these events), then Putin’s government is guilty not only of a cruel and
merciless overreaction to the hostage crisis, but also of directly organising the greatest armed
provocation in contemporary Russian history.
Considering these recent experiences, we cannot but conclude that if such provocations advance its
fundamental interests, the Kremlin is quite capable of launching fresh acts of bloody violence and
sacrificing tens and hundreds of new lives. The state of acute crisis, which had in the recent past
pushed the Russian government into similar ventures, has in no sense dissipated. Any idea that under
Putin the level of moral responsibility of those who make such decisions has grown would be highly
superficial and naive.
Factors both foreign and domestic
Two crucial factors, one of an international and the second of a domestic nature, have combined
recently to sharpen the crisis of the Putin regime. First, the war in Iraq served to further polarise the
various political forces in Russia. While one group of politicians and mainstream journalists is
advocating a quick restoration of partnership with the US, another group, perhaps more numerous
and influential, thinks that the conflict of interests between Russia and the US is bound to grow. This
second group calls for a fundamental change in global Russian policy to give it an anti-American
character, to strengthen an alliance with Europe and only pay lip service to the idea of partnership
with the leader of world imperialism.
Putin is conducting a balancing act between these two forces, utilising methods of Bonapartism to
preserve a semblance of consensus within the new Russian ruling elite. A rise in the tensions related
to Chechnya, combined with the renewal of friendly relations with the Bush administration, would
also place Putin “above” the sharpening conflict of these domestic constituencies, and would
dampen the internal opposition to his foreign policy of empirical zigzags and hesitant half measures.
The other important factor has to do with the opening of the electoral campaign for the Russian
parliament. The outcome of the December parliamentary election will largely determine whether
Putin succeeds in getting reelected president next year. Despite the absence of any open opposition
from among the influential political forces inside the country, he has no defined social or political
base of support. His main supporters come from within the state bureaucracy itself, from the military
and the special and secret services, as well as from sections of big business. However, all these
elements are disunited, tied together only by their personal loyalty to Putin, not by any common
political program.
According to numerous opinion polls, there is a huge gulf between Putin’s nominally high popularity
rating and the actual popular moods of the Russian electorate. For a time, this gulf was bridged by
hopes that Putin would be able to overcome the worst legacies of Yeltsin’s social and political
regime, and that he might improve the lot of the tens of millions of average citizens. But the absence
of any positive changes for the masses and the deepening of the tendencies of social breakdown,
which grow organically out of the policy of restoring capitalism, make the connection between the
masses of toilers and Putin ever more fragile and ephemeral. The optimistic hopes are dissipating,
giving way to a frightening vision of growing social and economic catastrophe and the absence of any
perspective for the majority of workers, youth and intellectuals.
Despite Putin’s frequent protestations of opposition to the war in Iraq, in the eyes of Russia’s
toilers his regime is increasingly seen as completely dependent upon the leading world powers, and
subservient first of all to the US. Putin’s government is unable to stand up to the imperialist and
domineering pretensions of the American ruling elite; Putin’s policies objectively lead to a further
weakening of the country’s economy and its defence capabilities.
These conditions create the possibility for a new political force to arise quickly and fill the abyss
between the ruling regime and popular aspirations. We are not discussing now the question of the
political nature of this political force; what we must note is that it might wrest control of events out
of the hands of the present cliques in the political oligarchy. It is to prevent such a scenario that the
Kremlin strategists may have decided that a new armed outrage in Chechnya is just the thing to
consolidate the nation around the existing government and its present leader.
The Kremlin’s political scene, however, consists not merely of a tableau of unified and
homogeneous elements supporting Putin. Rather, a number of internally warring combinations
compete for influence. If one might suppose that certain groups in the top echelons of Putin’s
regime might resort to extensive destabilisation in Chechnya to save the authority of the current
president, then other layers of the ruling elite might use the facts of such destabilisation to discredit
Putin and promote their own representatives to Moscow’s “throne.”
The “Berezovsky factor”
First and foremost in this regard, there is the “Berezovsky factor.” Everyone is aware that this
former oligarch and media magnate rose during Yeltsin’s years to become one of the leading
political figures in Russia, although he never occupied any truly influential post himself. Not only did
he become one of the main protagonists in the creation of a political entity that was later dubbed
the “Yeltsin family”—that is, the assembly of economic and political structures that was most
closely tied to Yeltsin and his immediate circle. Berezovsky also holds the title for introducing into
the Russian body politic the most odious and dirty political technologies. These dirty tricks secured
Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996 and promoted Putin in late 1999-early 2000.
It is well known that Berezovsky maintained contacts with leaders of the armed Chechen separatists,
even during the periods of military action by the Russian army. It is a well-established fact that in
1997 he transferred $3 million to Shamil Basaiev, one of the leading Chechen separatist field
commanders, supposedly for the building of a hospital. In a recent interview, Berezovsky as much as
admitted that he personally thought up the idea of organising the invasion by Basaiev’s and
Khattab’s detachments into Dagestan in August 1999.
Lately, having been forced into an exile in England, Berezovsky is conducting a campaign to discredit
Putin, and he is asserting that the explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk in the fall of 1999 were
organised by the FSB. However, he was at that time very close to these services and to a large extent
directed their activities.
Apparently, no one knows as much about the autumn 1999 explosions as Berezovsky. Continuing to
exert a great deal of influence in Russia through his agents, he can once again resort to techniques
that were developed under his leadership over the course of years with the aim of regaining for
himself and his associates the influence that he lost under Putin.
Putin’s entourage has already accused Berezovsky of trying to provoke mass unrest in Russia. A
couple of weeks before the recent explosions, Russian newspapers published transcripts of telephone
conversations that Berezovsky supposedly conducted with a number of influential leaders. In a
supposed talk with the Communist Party leader Ziuganov (an alliance with the CP was proclaimed by
Berezovsky as the necessary precondition for the liberals to succeed in the upcoming parliamentary
elections), the exiled oligarch called on the “communist” leader to organise anti-Semitic pogroms,
so as to accuse the current government of incompetence and failure to protect the citizens and
preserve civic order.
Berezovsky denies any such attempts or provocations. However, the very fact that Russia’s mass
media airs such scenarios and accuses certain politicians and groups of readiness to organise public
riots, and that the “talking heads” on TV view such suggestions as believable, signifies that similar
scenarios are indeed being hatched in some brains.
Regardless of who stands behind this latest series of explosions in Chechnya, they serve as a clear
warning: Again, as in the days of Stalin, within the Kremlin there are many people ready to prepare
“spicy dishes.”
============
《附件二》安娜介紹
Anna Politkovskaia
Anna Politkovskaia was born in 1958. After studying at the Moscow State University, she received a
diploma in journalism. Anna Politkovskaia has worked for various newspapers and collaborated with
TV and radio stations.
While working for Obshchaya Gazeta, she visited Chechnya for the first time in 1998 to conduct an
interview with President Maskhadov. Already working for the Novaya Gazeta, the independent
democratic newspaper, she concentrated on the second Chechnyan war and has visited Chechnya,
Dagestan and Ingushetia over fifty times.
Her works include Russia Under Putin and A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya (2001), a
compilation of dispatches written between 1999 and 2000. A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from
Chechnya was published in 2003.
In February 2001 Anna Politkovskaia was arrested while in southern Chechnya. She was formally
accused of violating the strict laws controlling media coverage of the conflict and was ordered out of
the enclave.
In October 2001, after receiving death threats related to her reporting in Chechnya, Anna
Politkovskaia relocated to Vienna for a time. Supported by the Vienna Institute for Human Sciences,
she was able to write her new book. During the hostage drama at the Nordost Theatre in 2002, Anna
Politkovskaia agreed to the hostagetakers’ request to assist during negotiations.
Anna Politkovskaia was decorated with the Participant in Battles Medal for her work in the field. In
addition to other awards, Anna Politkovskaia received the 2000 Golden Pen Award from the Russian
Union of Journalists, the Freedom of Expression Award of the Index on Censorship, the IWMF Courage
in Journalism Award, and the OSCE Prize for Journalism and Democracy.
Anna Politkovskaia is currently writing her fourth non-fiction book entitled Putin’s Russia. She writes
for the Muscovite Novaya Gazeta and holds lectures in Great Britain, France, Holland, Germany and
other Western European countries.
Anna Politkovskaia lives with her family in Moscow.
=============
《附件三》也是安娜介紹
Anna Politkovskaia Honored by the Club of American Journalists
Anna Stepanovna Politkovskaia, Waging member from Russia, was honored for exemplary reporting onevents in Russia at the annual awards ceremony held by the Club of American Journalists. She is the
first recipient of the "Artem Borovik" award, which was initiated by a number of American media
outlets and will be awarded annually to journalists whose work sheds light on events in Russia.
Anna Politkovskaia is a reporter for Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper. Over the past two years,
she has covered events in refugee camps in Dagestan, as well as reported on events in Ingushetia and
the Chechen Republic, which she visited numerous times last year. Anna is also the author of the
book Travel to Hell: The Chechen Diary.
In addition to her work as a journalist, Anna has organized the relocation of 89 homes for the elderly
from Grozny to Russia to escape the effects of war. Last summer, 22 elderly men were returned to
Grozny. However, they were left without water, medicine, food, or clothing. In August 2000, under
Anna's leadership, Novaya Gazeta began an initiative entitled "Grozny: a house for the elderly," and
collected 5.5 tons of cargo and approximately $5,000.
Aside from her most recent award, Anna was awarded the "Golden Nib of Russia" in January 2000 for
a series of reports about the situation in the Chechen Republic. Anna's other awards include the "Kind
Act - Kind Heart" award given to her by the Union of Journalists in the Russian Federation, an award
for articles exposing corruption, and the "Golden Gong - 2000" certificate for a series of reports about
the Chechen Republic.
On February 20, 2001 Anna was arrested in the Chechen Republic. Thanks to public support, she was
released in a week. According to her colleagues from Novaya Gazeta, "Anna Politkovskaia works
under dangerous conditions connected with transitional borders and overcomes the infinite number
of obstacles created by federal armies. In the face of information blockade, Anna Politkovskaia
always shows high professionalism and courage."
==========
《附件四》，安娜揭露此事的報導，叫做《有一名恐怖份子還活著：我們找到了他》，發表
在俄國報紙 Novaya Gazeta，日期是去年 4 月 28 日。
One of the terrorists survived. We found him.
http://eng.terror99.ru/publications/096.htm
by Anna Politkovskaya
Novaya Gazeta
April 28, 2003
Six months ago there was a terrorist act on Dubrovka. During these months, we have asked the same
questions many times: how could this have happened? How were they allowed to enter Moscow? Who
allowed them to do so? And why? As it turns out, there is a witness. He is also a participant.
At first there was only scarce information: one of the terrorists, who took hostage the "Nord Ost"
theatre on Dubrovka, is alive.
We checked this information, repeatedly analyzed the list of names of Barayev's group, which was
printed in the press. We made many inquiries. And we found him. The man, whose last name was
published on an official list of the terrorists' names, those who took hostage the people who attended
the musical.
"Were you in Barayev's group when "Nord-Ost" was taken hostage?"
"I was."
"Did you enter with them?"
"Yes."
"⋯Khanpash Nurdyevich Terkibayev. (Further the name of a government newspaper follows). Special
correspondent⋯" – I read the card with the capital letters "PRESS" on a dark margin.
Document number 1165. Signed – Yu. Gorbenko. It's true, there is such a director at this newspaper.
"What subjects do you write about? About Chechnya?"
⋯Silence.
"Do you show up for work? Which department do you work at? Who is your Editor-in-Chief?"
⋯ Silence again. He pretends that he doesn't understand Russian well. But is it possible that a special
correspondent of the main government paper of a country does not know Russian?
Khanpash's eyes, Mongoloid-like, not very similar to Chechen eyes, look perplexed. And he does not
pretend, he honestly does not understand what I'm talking about – he is very far from journalism.
"Did someone give you this document to serve as a cover for your real work?"
He smiles slyly:
"I wouldn't mind writing⋯ I just haven't had the time to figure things out. I just received this
document – on April 7th. Do you see the date? I don't have to go there. I work in the President's
Information Office."
"You work under Porshnev? What's your position?" (Ref.: Igor Porshnev is the director of the
Information Department of President Putin's Administration. So he is a "direct boss" of 30-year old
Khanpash Terkibayev, a native of a Chechen village called Mesker-Yurt.)
But Porshnev's last name puzzles this "special correspondent." Khanpash simply does not know who
Porshnev is.
"When I need to, I meet with Yastrzhembsky. I work for him. Here we are in a photograph together."
True, the photograph is of him with Sergei Vladimirovich (Yastrzhembsky). Sergei Vladimirovich is not
looking at the camera and seems quite dissatisfied. But it is indeed Khanpash on that photo - the
same man who sits in front of me know, in the "Sputnik" hotel on Leninsky Prospekt – Khanpash is
looking directly at the camera: here we are, together. The photograph tells a story - it is evident
that it was unwelcome by Sergei Vladimirovich, and, evidently, it was Khanpash who insisted on it,
and now he tells me of his difficult life journey, accompanying the story with a demonstration of
numerous photos that he pulls out of his briefcase.
"Maskhadov and I, Arsanov and I, myself in Kremlin, Saidulayev and I, Gil-Robles and I⋯" (Editor's
note: Gil-Robles is the European Commissioner on Human Rights)."
I look closer at the photos – a significant number of them seem to be crude forgeries. (Editor's note:
later checked with the specialist- and they confirmed the forgeries.) Why? Khanpash pretends that he
doesn't understand, rummages about in his briefcase, and then pulls out a photo of him with Margaret
Thatcher and Maskhadov - to prove that he has close connections to London.
The year is 1998, Maskhadov is in a papakha, Thatcher is in the middle, and on the other side of her
is Khanpash. Meanwhile, Maskhadov looks like he did before the war, but Khanpash looks the same as
he does now⋯ Why? But he is already pulling out another photo. Maskhadov is dressed in camouflage,
his beard has a significant amount of gray hair, he looks awful - and Khanpash does not look so well
either. This one is genuine.
"Aren't you afraid to walk around Moscow with these photos? In Chechnya you could get shot
immediately⋯ For this, here – firearms would be planted on you and you'd be locked up in jail for
many years⋯"
This is how he answers:
"I also know Surkov." His tone becomes boastful. "After "Nord-Ost" I've met with Surkov. Twice." (Ref:Vladislav Surkov is an influential Deputy Head of the President's Administration.)
"Why?"
"I helped develop Putin's policy for Chechnya. The post-"Nord-Ost" policy."
"And how did it go? Did you help?"
"We need peace."
"What an original thought."
"I'm currently working on peace negotiations under the orders of Yastrzhembsky and Surkov. The idea
is to conduct negotiations with those who are in the mountains.
"Is this idea yours or the Kremlin's?"
"It's mine, but it is supported by the Kremlin."
"These talks- will they be with Maskhadov?"
"No. The Kremlin does not agree with Maskhadov."
"Then with whom?"
"With Vakha Arsanov. I've just met with him."
"Where?"
"In Chechnya."
"Then what's going to happen to Maskhadov?"
"We have to convince him to give up his authority until the Presidential election in Chechnya."
"Are you involved in that, too?"
"Yes, but for this I have no authority. I am acting on my own. Regardless, there can't possibly be an
election."
"And if they do take place, who would you, personally, place your bet on?"
"Khasbulatov and Saidulayev. They are the third force. Not Maskhadov, not Kadyrov. That is the way I
am. After "Nord-Ost", it was I who organized the negotiations of the Chechen parliament's deputies
with the Administration, with Yastrzhembsky."
"Yes, and that surprised many," I say. "When Isa Temirov together with the other deputies openly
appeared in Moscow, spoke at the famous press-conference at the Interfax news agency and called
for a referendum vote, which means the vote against Maskhadov, even though they had supported
him before⋯ So you were behind this?"
"Yes," he says proudly.
"Did you vote at the referendum?"
"Me? No." He laughs. "I come from the "Charto" clan, we are called "Jews" in Chechnya."
"Is it possible to say the outcome of the "Nord Ost" tragedy was going to be the same as for
Budennovsk, the end the second Chechen War?"
This question is not accidental. We are at the main point. Khanpash has participated in absolutely
everything. He is the man for all occasions of our politics. He knows everyone, he has access toeverything, he can handle anything having to do with the North Caucasus. If someone needs to meet
with Maskhadov – he will find him. If without Maskhadov – he can organize that too. Or so he tells
us, at least⋯ He is an actor by profession, he says; he graduated from Grozny University with a
theatre major. It does not matter that there was no theatre department at that university and that
he himself cannot remember who his professors where.
More importantly, he claims that "Zakayev and I - we are friends, we worked in the theatre together."
During the first war he took a video camera into his hands and worked for television. He accompanied
Basayev in the Budennovsk raid, but was not convicted for it, on the contrary- he received amnesty
for it in April of 2000.
"Where were the papers about the amnesty given out?"
"In the Chechen Federal Security Service (FSB) department of the city of Argun."
This is a very serious detail. All throughout this war, the Argun FSB have been one of the most brutal.
During the time when Khanpash was amnestied, no one came out of the Argun FSB alive. Khanpash is
the first to make it out alive, and with an official document of amnesty for Budennovsk.
Between the two wars, Khanpash, as the "hero of Budennovsk", becomes the leading specialist of the
press service⋯ of President Maskhadov. He had his own program on Maskhadov's television channel
called "The President's Heart", later renamed as "The President's Path". Later, however, before the
second war, he was replaced and forced to leave Maskhadov's inner circle; but when the armed
conflict started, he returned and again became a "vehement Jihad fighter".
Surprisingly, right under the nose of federal forces and all kinds of special services, in the midst of
heavy fighting, when everyone ran for their life, Khanpash still managed to produce his television
program, the title of which can be translated from Chechen approximately like this: "My motherland
is where there is Jihad."
"Really, I didn't believe in that then, and I don't believe in it now."
"What do you mean? Your motherland is not where there is Jihad?"
"I just had a television program like this."
"It seems that Maskhadov expelled you from his inner circle again recently?"
"Not Maskhadov, his representatives abroad did. But I don't believe them. Rakhman Dushuyev in
Turkey told me that he received a videotape from President Maskhadov, who says that he no longer
wants me to call myself his representative, but I have not seen this videotape and have not talked
with Maskhadov⋯ And recently I've met with Kusama and Anzor in Dubai. They were my hosts. I ate
and slept there⋯" (Editor's note: Kusama is Maskhadov's wife, Anzor is his son.)
"Dubai, Turkey, Jordan, Strasbourg⋯ Do you travel all the time? Do you get visas everywhere?"
"I know all of the Chechens. That is why I travel in many countries and call all Chechens to unite."
"Did you come to Dubai from Baku?"
"Yes."
"And there you appeared after the October terrorist act in Moscow, right? And asked the Chechens
living there to help you, told them that you are one of the surviving hostage takers of the "Nord-Ost",
and that you urgently need contacts in the Arab world, in order to escape the persecution?"
"How do you know this?"
"From the Chechens in Baku. And from the papers. You know, your last name was published in the list
of terrorists who seized "Nord Ost". By the way, did you sue this publication?"
"No. Why would I? I just asked Yastrzhembsky: ‘How could this happen?'" "And what did he say?"
"He said, ‘Don't pay any attention to this.'"
The most recent take-off in Khanpash Terkibayev's political carrier corresponds with our common
tragedy – the events on October 23-26, 2002. With the terrorist act, which left behind numerous
victims, when a detachment under the leadership of Barayev's nephew⋯ took hostage almost 800
people in the building of the House of Culture on Melnikov street and the whole country did not know
how to save them, tossed and turned, wailed, waiting for an explosion at any moment.
"By the way, have you known Barayev Junior long?"
"I've known him for a long time. I know everyone in Chechnya."
"Where there explosives there?"
"No, there weren't. There weren't any."
It is precisely after "Nord Ost" that Khanpash's career took off. He did indeed become "a supporter" of
President Putin's Administration. He was given the necessary documents, which guaranteed him
freedom to go everywhere he needed to go, maneuvering from Maskhadov to Yastrzhembsky.
He headed the negotiations on the behalf of Putin's Administration with the deputies of the Chechen
parliament- they were needed for support of the referendum. He fought for the guarantees of
immunity for these deputies, should they come to Moscow. He won.
It was Khanpash, and not anyone else, took those deputies, and acted as the leader of their group, to
Strasbourg, to high cabinets of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly, and there the
deputies conducted themselves correctly – under the direction of Rogozin, chairman of the Duma
Committee on International Affairs.
Naturally, a question arises: Why? Why ? Khanpash. For what? How did he do to prove his loyalty? It is
clear that without such proof nothing of the sort could have happened to him⋯
Now, the most important part. The essential part of our long conversation.
In all likelihood Khanpash is exactly the man who everyone involved in the "Nord Ost" tragedy looked
so hard for. The man, who ensured the terrorist act from the inside. According to the information in
our newspaper's possession (and himself does not deny it – what a vain man!), Khanpash is an agent
planted there by the special forces.
He entered the building with the terrorists.
As one of them.
According to his own words, he secretly arranged for them to get into Moscow, and into "Nord Ost"
itself.
It was he who convinced the terrorists that everything is "under control", that there are plenty of
corrupt people everywhere", that "the Russians again were bribed", as they were before to allow
people to leave the besieged cities of Grozny and Komsomolsk, all they had to do was "make noise",
and a "second Budennovsk" would take place, and thus peace would be reached, and later, after the
task has been completed, "we would be allowed to leave alive" – though not everyone.
It turns out that he was the only one to leave alive.
He left the building before it was stormed. Furthermore, he had a plan of the theatre building on
Dubrovka, the plan which neither Barayev's nephew, the leader of the terrorists, nor, at first, the
special services unit, preparing to storm the building, had in their possession.
Why? Because he was a part of those forces, who are much higher in the special services hierarchythen "Vityaz" and "Alfa", who were going in to face death.
Regardless, whether he had the plan or not – in the big picture it does not matter, just a minor
detail.
As a matter of fact, Khanpash has no problem lying – remember the fake photographs? And those
who could have either confirmed or denied certain details- for example, where his position was –
they, it seems, all died. Or just aren't as talkative. Do I allow the idea that he was not the only
special forces agent in there? I do. If there was at least one, why couldn't there be two?
The heart of the matter, for us, is in another point – if there was an agent sent by the special forces
into "Nord Ost", that means that the authorities knew that the terrorist act was being prepared. The
authorities thus participated in its preparation, and it doesn't even matter with what purpose.
The most important thing – the authorities (which ones?) knew what was going on long before all of
us knew about it, and therefore have put their people under the heaviest blow, while knowing that
the blow is coming, knowing, that thousands will not be able to recover, and that hundreds will die.
The authorities were going to pull off another Kursk. (Do you remember the signals given by those
poor people in the seized theater? "We are the second Kursk⋯ Our country forgot about us⋯ Our
country does not need us⋯ Our country wants for us to die⋯" Many outside the theatre then became
indignant – the hostages have gone too far⋯ However, that is exactly how it turned out...)
And then, it means, the question remains: What for? Six months ago, what did the people die for?
And here, before we attempt to answer this question, we have to figure out: who are these
authorities, who knew? The Kremlin? Putin? The FSB? The usual suspects?
Our authorities are not a monolith. Neither are the special forces. And it is not true that the majority
of officers, who worked in those days in the headquarters near the building on Dubrovka only
pretended to fight the tragedy, knowing that it is a hoax. Most of their struggle was genuine. As was
"Alfa's" and "Vityaz". As was ours⋯
But! If there was a Khanpash – that means, we have no choice, and some part of the authorities,
which knew, which only pretended to sympathize during our 72 hour insanity, our tears, heart
attacks, screams, heroic deeds, deaths?
And this- this changes the entire chain of events six months ago.
Who are the special forces who knew?
Of course, it is not the special forces teams who stormed the building. If those fighters understood
the complexity of the hoax, then, possibly, there would be a repetition of the events in 1993 with
their refusal to storm, and the story today would be different.
And it was not the officers of the FSB and the MVD (the Ministry of Internal Affairs), who in all
seriousness planned the operation to free the hostages. They did not infiltrate Khanpash. And then
give him a job. But who was it?
Terkibayev himself did not answer that question.
So it seems, the FSB and the MVD just trying to solve and acting out someone else's scenario.
During the second Chechen war such methods were well tested by military intelligence. The leaders
of the so-called "squadrons of death" were the employees of the GRU. Executions of our compatriots
without court hearings – it is their work. And neither the FSB and the MVD, nor prosecutors, or the
courts can do anything about their bloody leadership. Then again, a common practice of the GRU
squadrons is to use the Chechen bandits. And also, - their former victims (widows - who became such
after the actions of the "squadrons of death") – since this is very convenient material for reaching
the goals of terrifying all people.
So – was it them? Or someone else, unknown to us?
I don't have an answer. But it is very important to get to the bottom of this. And it is also, without
doubt, necessary.
⋯ So what did the people die for? What kind of an insane price is 129 lives?
Here is what we saw, when light was shed on a tiny part of the story about an agent provocateur of
our days.
People have died, but the agent provocateur is thriving. And it is exactly him, who is a part of the
political inner circle. He is well fed, looks well, and, most importantly, he continues⋯ In the next
few days he leaves for Chechnya. What will he prepare this time?
"I need 24 hours to meet with Maskhadov," he says.
"Only 24 ours?"
"Well, perhaps two days."
Khanpash is condescending towards the nanve. Towards us.
Anna Politkovskaya, correspondent of "Novaya Gazeta"
04/28/2003
=========
《附件五》史丹佛大學一位資深研究員對歌劇院事件的詳細報告
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 1)
By John B. Dunlop
John B. Dunlop is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution
Compiled by Roman Kupchinsky.
http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/2004%20Dunlop-RFERL%20Paper.htm
On 6 November 2002, a meeting was held in Moscow of the Public Committee to Investigate the
Circumstances Behind the Explosions of the Apartment Buildings in Moscow and the Ryazan Exercises
(all of which occurred in September 1999). The meeting took place at the Andrei Sakharov Center,
and among those present were the committee's chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev, its deputy
chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov (assassinated on 17 April 2003), lawyer Boris Zolotukhin,
writer Aleksandr Tkachenko, journalist Otto Latsis, and human rights activist Valerii Borshchev. After
the meeting had concluded, the members of the committee took a formal decision to "broaden its
mandate" and to include the Moscow hostage-taking episode of 23-26 October 2002 -- and especially
the actions of the Russian special services during that period -- as an additional subject of inquiry
coming under the committee's purview.(1)
An Unusual Kind Of 'Joint Venture'?
The following is an attempt to make some sense out of the small torrent of information that exists
concerning the October 2002 events at Dubrovka. In my opinion, the original plan for the terrorist
action at and around Dubrovka bears a strong similarity to the campaign of terror bombings
unleashed upon Moscow and other Russian urban centers (Buinaksk, Volgodonsk) in September of
1999. In both cases there is strong evidence of official involvement in, and manipulation of, key
actions; so the question naturally arises as to whether Vladimir Putin in any way sanctioned them.
Although there is additional evidence bearing on Putin's possible role, this paper will take an agnostic
position on the issue, and will also not review it.
The October 2002 hostage-taking episode in a large theater containing close to 1,000 people was
evidently, at least in its original conception, to have been preceded and accompanied by terror
bombings claiming the lives of perhaps hundreds of Muscovites, a development that would have
terrorized and enraged the populace of the entire country. However, in view of the suspicious
connections and motivations of the perpetrators of this incident, as well as the contradictory nature
of the actions of the authorities, it would seem appropriate to envisage this operation as
representing a kind of "joint venture" (on, for example, the model of the August 1999 incursion into
Daghestan) involving elements of the Russian special services and also radical Chechen leaders such
as Shamil Basaev and Movladi Udugov.
Only a few individuals among the special services and the Chechen extremist leadership would likely
have known of the existence of this implicit deal. Both "partners" had a strong motive to derail the
movement occurring in Russia, and being backed by the West, to bring about a negotiated settlement
to the Chechen conflict. Both also wanted to blacken the reputation of the leader of the Chechen
separatist moderates, Aslan Maskhadov. In addition, the Chechen extremists clearly saw their action
as a kind of ambitious fund-raiser aimed at attracting financial support from wealthy donors in the
Gulf states and throughout the Muslim world (hence the signs displayed in Arabic, the non-traditional
[for Chechens] garb of the female terrorists, and so on). The Russian authorities, for their part, had a
propitious chance to depict the conflict in Chechnya as a war against an Al-Qaeda-type Chechen
terrorism, a message that could be expected to play well abroad, and especially in the United States.
As in the case of the 1999 terror bombings, meticulous planning -- including the use of "cut-outs,"
false documents, and the secret transport of weapons and explosives to Moscow from the North
Caucasus region -- underlay the preparation for this terrorist assault. In this instance, however, the
perpetrators were to be seen as Chechens of a "Wahhabi" orientation whose modus operandi was to
recall that of the notorious Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Once the operation had moved into its active stage, however, strange and still not fully explained
developments began to occur. An explosion at a McDonald's restaurant in southwest Moscow on 19
October immediately riveted the attention of the Moscow Criminal Investigation (MUR) -- an elite unit
of the regular police -- which then moved swiftly to halt the activity of the terrorists. The explosion
at the McDonald's restaurant was, fortunately, a small one, and caused the death of only a single
person. Two large bombs set to explode before the assault on Dubrovka was launched failed to
detonate. Likewise a planned bombing incident at a large restaurant in Pushkin Square in the center
of the capital failed to take place.
In my opinion, the most likely explanation for these "technical" failures lies in acts of intentional
sabotage committed by some of the terrorists. What remains unclear at this juncture is why certain
individuals among the terrorists chose to render the explosive devices incapable of functioning. One
key point, however, seems clear: The Chechen extremist leaders felt no pressing need to blow up or
shoot hundreds of Russian citizens. They were aware that such actions might so enrage the Russian
populace that it would then have supported any military actions whatever, including a possible fullscale extermination of the Chechen people. So what Shamil Basaev, Aslambek Khaskhanov, and their
comrades in arms seem to have done is, in a sense, to outplay the special services in a game of chess.
Most of the bombs, it turns out, were actually fakes, while the few women's terrorist belts that did
actually contain explosives were of danger primarily to the women themselves. As Russian security
affairs correspondent Pavel Felgenhauer has rightly suggested, the aim of the extremist leaders
seems to have been to force the Russian special services to kill ethnic Russians on a large scale, and
that is what happened.(2) Only an adroit cover-up by the Russian authorities prevented the full
extent (conceivably more than 200 deaths) of the debacle from becoming known.
A central question to be resolved by future researchers is whether or not the Russian special forces
planning an assault on the theater building at Dubrovka were aware that virtually all of the bombs
located there -- including all of the powerful and deadly bombs -- were in fact incapable of
detonating. If the special forces were aware of this, then there was clearly no need to employ a
potentially lethal gas, which, it turned out, caused the deaths of a large number of the hostages. The
special forces could have relatively easily and rapidly overwhelmed the lightly armed terrorists.
Moreover, if they were in fact aware that the bombs were "dummies," then the special forces
obviously had no need to kill all of the terrorists, especially those who were asleep from the effects
of the gas. It would, one would think, have made more sense to take some of them alive.
Pressure Builds For A Negotiated Settlement With The Chechen Separatists
In the months preceding the terrorist act at the Dubrovka theater, which was putting on a popular
musical, "Nord-Ost," the Kremlin leadership found itself coming under heavy political pressure both within Russia and in the West to enter into high-level negotiations with the moderate wing of the
Chechen separatists headed by Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected Chechen president in 1997. Publicopinion polls in Russia showed that a continuation of the Chechen conflict was beginning to erode
Putin's generally high approval ratings. With parliamentary elections scheduled for just over a year's
time (in December 2003), this represented a worrisome problem for the Kremlin. In a poll taken by
the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), whose findings were reported on 8
October, respondents were asked "how the situation in Chechnya has changed since V. Putin was
elected president."(3) Thirty percent of respondents believed that the situation had "gotten better,"
but 43 percent opined that it had "not changed," while 21 percent thought that it had "gotten worse."
These results were significantly lower than Putin's ratings in other categories. In similar fashion, a
September 2002 Russia-wide poll taken by VTsIOM found 56 percent of respondents favoring peace
negotiations as a way to end the Chechen conflict while only 34 percent supported the continuing of
military actions.(4)
On 16-19 August 2002, key discussions had occurred in the Duchy of Liechtenstein involving two
former speakers of the Russian parliament, Ivan Rybkin and Ruslan Khasbulatov, as well as two
deputies of the Russian State Duma: journalist and leading "democrat" Yurii Shchekochikhin (died,
possibly from the effects of poison, on 3 July 2003) and Aslambek Aslakhanov, a retired Interior
Ministry general who had been elected to represent Chechnya in the Duma. Representing separatist
leader Maskhadov at the talks was Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Akhmed Zakaev. The talks in
Liechtenstein had been organized by the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (executive
director, Glen Howard), one of whose leading figures was former U.S. national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski. The meetings in Liechtenstein were intended to restore the momentum that had
been created by earlier talks held at Sheremetevo-2 Airport outside of Moscow between Zakaev and
Putin's plenipotentiary presidential representative in the Southern Federal District, retired military
General Viktor Kazantsev, on 18 November 2001.(5) Efforts to resuscitate the talks had failed to
achieve any success because of the strong opposition of the Russian side.
Following the stillborn initiative of November 2001, the Kremlin had apparently jettisoned the idea of
holding any negotiations whatsoever with moderate separatists in favor of empowering its handpicked
candidate for Chechen leader, former mufti Akhmad Kadyrov. This tactic, said to be backed by
Aleksandr Voloshin, the then presidential chief of staff, soon became known as "Chechenization."
Other elements among the top leadership of the presidential administration, such as two deputy
chiefs of staff, Viktor Ivanov -- a former deputy director of the FSB -- and Igor Sechin, as well as
certain leaders in the so-called power ministries, for example, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director
Nikolai Patrushev, were reported to be adamantly opposed both to Chechenization and, even more
so, to holding talks with moderate separatists; what they wanted was aggressively to pursue the war
to a victorious conclusion.(6) If that effort took years more to achieve, then so be it.
In a path-breaking report on the meetings in Liechtenstein, a leading journalist who frequently
publishes in the weekly "Moskovskie novosti," Sanobar Shermatova, wrote that the participants had
discussed two peace plans: the so-called "Khasbulatov plan" and the so-called "Brzezinski plan."(7)
Eventually, she went on, the participants decided to merge the two plans into a "Liechtenstein plan,"
which included elements of both. Khasbulatov's plan was based on the idea of granting to Chechnya
"special status," with international guarantees being provided by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and by the Council of Europe. Under Khasbulatov's plan, Chechnya
would be free to conduct its own internal and foreign policies, with the exception of those functions
that it voluntarily delegated to the Russian Federation. The republic was to remain within Russian
borders and was to preserve Russian citizenship and currency.
Under the "Brzezinski plan," Chechens would "acknowledge their respect for the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation," while Russia, for its part, would "acknowledge the right of the Chechens
to political, though not national, self-determination." A referendum would be held under which
"Chechens would be given the opportunity to approve the constitutional basis for extensive selfgovernment" modeled on what the Republic of Tatarstan currently enjoys. Russian troops would
remain stationed on Chechnya's southern borders. "International support," the plan stressed, "must be
committed to a substantial program of economic reconstruction, with a direct international presence
on the ground in order to promote the rebuilding and stabilization of Chechen society." The authors
of this plan underlined that "Maskhadov's endorsement of such an approach would be essential
because of the extensive support he enjoys within Chechen society."
On 17 October 2002 -- just six days before the terrorist incident at Dubrovka -- the website grani.ru, citing information that had previously appeared in the newspaper "Kommersant," reported that new
meetings of the Liechtenstein group were scheduled to be held in two weeks' time.(8) Duma Deputy
Aslakhanov and separatist Deputy Premier Zakaev were planning to meet one-on-one in Switzerland
in order "seriously to discuss the conditions which could lead to negotiations." Former speakers
Rybkin and Khasbulatov, the website added, would also be taking part in the negotiations. In midOctober, Aslakhanov emphasized in a public statement: "President Putin has not once expressed
himself against negotiations with Maskhadov. To the contrary, in a conversation with me, he
expressed doubt whether there was a real force behind Maskhadov. Would the people follow after
him?" This question put by Putin to Aslakhanov, "Kommersant vlast" reporter Olga Allenova observed,
"was perceived in the ranks of the separatists as a veiled agreement [by Putin] to negotiations."(9)
On 10 September 2002, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov had published an essay
entitled "Six Points On Chechnya" on the pages of the official Russian government newspaper
"Rossiiskaya Gazeta" in which he stressed the urgent need to conduct "negotiations with [separatist]
field commanders or at least some of them."(10) "This struggle," Primakov insisted, "can be stopped
only through negotiations. Consequently elections in Chechnya cannot be seen as an alternative to
negotiations." Primakov also underlined his conviction that "the [Russian] military must not play the
dominant role in the settlement." In an interview which appeared in the 4 October 2002 issue of
"Nezavisimaya gazeta," Salambek Maigov, co-chairman of the Antiwar Committee of Chechnya,
warmly praised Primakov's "Six Points," noting, "Putin and Maskhadov can find compromise decisions.
But the problem is that there are groups in the Kremlin which hinder this process."
During September 2002, grani.ru reported that both Maigov and former Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin
were supporting a recent suggestion by Primakov that "the status of Finland in the [tsarist] Russian
Empire can suit the Chechen Republic."(11) Another possibility, Rybkin pointed out, would be for
Chechnya to be accorded "the status of a disputed territory, such as was held by the Aland Islands [of
Finland], to which both Sweden and Finland had earlier made claims." A broad spectrum of Russian
political leaders -- from "democrats" like Grigorii Yavlinskii, Boris Nemtsov, and Sergei Kovalev to
Gennadii Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation -- had, Rybkin said,
expressed an interest in such models.
During the course of a lengthy interview -- whose English translation appeared on the separatist
website chechenpress.com on 23 October (the day of the seizure of the hostages in Moscow) --
President Maskhadov warmly welcomed the intensive efforts being made to bring about a negotiated
settlement to the Chechen conflict: "In Dr. Brzezinski's plan," Maskhadov commented, "we see the
concern of influential forces in the United States.... We have a positive experience of collaboration
with Ivan Petrovich Rybkin [the reference is to the year 1997, when Rybkin was secretary of the
Russian Security
